ABSTRACT
§1. INTRODUCTION
From the very start, equality and non-discrimination have been central objectives of the policies of what was then the European Economic Community. However, the relevant law was mainly instrumental with respect to the Community's economic goals, both in the context of free movement (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality) and in social law (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex). Indeed, European Community sex equality law started out as a matter of economic equality, 1 though later the Court of Justice lifted what was then Art. 119 of the EEC Treaty (now, after amendment, Art. 141 EC) on equal pay for men and women up to the level of a general principle of Community law (Defrenne III): 2 Today, respect for human rights is explicitly recognized in Art. 6 EU and at the level of soft law in the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights? Nevertheless, EU social policy -of which EC sex equality legislation is a part -has long remained heavily market-oriented in its scope, in its approach and in its function in the EU legal order. 4 As has been pointed out by Fredman, 5 a shift from this economic or market-oriented approach to a human rights approach includes a shift from formal to substantive equality and from a reactive to a proactive approach to combating discrimination. This contribution aims to examine one possible avenue towards such a human rights approach in the field of gender equality in the European Union, namely the approach prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (henceforth: CEDAW). So far this Convention has played only a small role in the academic and political discourse about the construction of EC anti-discrimination legislation. 6 It would seem to the present writers that CEDAW's full potential to advance the case of equality for women has not yet been realized in the European Union? It must certainly be recognised that EC sex equality law has had considerable impact on the possibilities for European women to gain access to the labour market and to secure equal treatment in relation to pay, working conditions and workrelated social security rights. However, the fact remains that in some respects the results have been very disappointing.
Against this background, the present writers are convinced that CEDA W can provide inspiration and open new avenues to solve some of the problems that are the consequence of the current approach to gender equality jn the EU. Accordingly, this paper argues that from a feminist perspective the best possible avenue to improve EC law in view of eliminating discrimination against women in the Member States is to follow the approach of CEDA W, with its sophisticated way of addressing sex discrimination. This argument relates, first, to the interpretation of existing EC law. It relies on Art. 6 EU, which states that the European Union is founded on the principle of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. This paper argues that based on this provision and at least within the limits of the European Union's competences, the existing sex equality law must be interpreted in the light of human rights law such as enshrined in CEDA W. In this framework, the Convention's recognised role as a source of inspiration for the interpretation of EC law must be taken much more seriously. Second, the argument of the usefulness of CEDA W concerns the drafting of new EC law. Given that the European Community is not a Signatory to CEDAW, it is not bound by the Convention in a strict, legal sense. Therefore, it cannot be argued that EC law is invalid or at least reviewable if it is incompatible with CEDA W. Instead, the argument made in this paper is that the EU Member States must take the obligations imposed on them as States Parties to the Convention seriously not only on the level of national law but also when they act as the Masters of the Treaties and make EU and EC law which, in turn, provides the framework for the adoption of secondary law. 8 In explaining these arguments, the paper proceeds as follows: after a brief description of the content and the scope ofCEDAW (infra 2), the Convention's approach to equality is compared to that of existing EC sex equality law (infra 3). In a final part, the paper describes the influence that a correct reading of the Convention could (and, in our view, should) have on EU policy and legislation in the field of gender equality (infra 4). The paper concludes with a short paragraph summarising the added value of this part of international human rights law for the development of an effective equal rights strategy of the European Union (infra 5). For reasons of space, the history and content of CEDAW are not described in this paper, 9 and neither are the mechanisms to implement and supervise the Convention discussed. 10 Below, the concept of non-discrimination which forms the basis of the Convention (A) and the Convention's scope and purpose (B) are described briefly.
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A. THE ENCOMPASSING CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION IN CEDAW
Discrimination for the purposes of the Convention means 'any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field' (Art. 1 CEDAW).
There are three particularly important aspects to this definition. First, under the Convention the principle of equality between men and women is directly and openly linked to the enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms. A breach of the non-discrimination principle is by itself considered to be a breach of a human right of women. What makes CEDA W special is that under this Convention such a breach is linked to a breach of other human rights, such as in the sphere of participatory rights, freedom rights and social and economical rights. This means that it is not unequal treatment as such that is condemned, but more specifically unequal treatment that leads to a breach of fundamental rights of women. 12 This means that, under the Convention, It can be argued that this is a disadvantage if compared to a formal and neutral non-discrimination principle in which discrimination is defined as 'any form of (non-justifiable) unequal treatment on a certain suspect ground' because in the substantive view the right not to be discriminated against can only be invoked when the unequal treatment leads to an infringement of the human rights of a person (compare Art. 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is explicitly formulated as a connected right). However, the present authors believe that the added value of a substantive approach compared to a purely formal approach overweighs this possibly restrictive effect. In addition, the formal view sometimes leads to questionable lawsuits. In a Dutch case, a postman claimed that he has been the principle of non-discrimination clearly is a substantive norm that gives directions to what kind of treatment is required in order not to violate this principle.
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Second, CEDA W prohibits discrimination against women and thereby recognises the fact that it is women who historically have suffered and still suffer from a variety of forms of discrimination. In other words, the Convention is based on an asymmetrical concept of equality or non-discrimination. Indeed, the whole idea of CEDAW is to overcome the situation that women are discriminated against. This means that the introduction of a policy hurting the position of women under the guise of equal treatment of men would never be allowed since such a policy would evidently be in breach of the Convention's second goal (improving the position of women; see below para. 2.B.2).
14 At the same time, this does not mean that the Convention only calls for actions that are solely directed towards women. For example, measures aimed at facilitating the combination of care work and paid work for men perfectly fit the Convention's framework.
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Thirdly, the concept of discrimination under the Convention is not directed towards assimilation of women to male standards or norms but rather towards the recognition of diversity. The usual construction under national and international sex equality law is that women have a right to treatment 'on the basis of equality with men'. This means that their situation needs to be in line with the situation of men. This has been replaced in the Convention by the formula that there is a right to be treated 'on a basis of equality of men and women'. Under a traditional and comparative approach, the male norm remains largely uncontested, meaning that women are required to 'fit into' social and economic structures and systems that are often not adequate to meet their aims and needs. In contrast, CEDA W requires that the existing male norm is first scrutinised and subsequently abolished. Accordingly, the Convention is a tool to facilitate gender diversity and to enhance structural change in which women's needs are incorporated. The effect of 'levelling down' is one of the notorious problems of formal equal treatment legislation; see further below, para. 3.A. The CEDA W Committee commented as follows on the policy of Norway: 'The Committee applauded the Government of Norway for directing attention to the necessary changes in men's roles and tasks as an important element in achieving true gender equality, including men's encouragement to use their right to paternity leave and to increase their involvement as caretakers in the labor market.' Norway (1995), NS0/38, CEDAW/C/SR.277, para. 486. See also the comments on Finland (1995), A/50/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 272, para. 388. This is discussed in more detail below, para. 2.B.3, where the third objective of the Convention (and Art. Sa CEDA W) is explained.
B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF CEDAW
As is already clear from the wording of Art. 1 CEDAW, cited above, the Convention addresses the political, economic, cultural, social and private life of women. Arts. 6-16 CEDA W relate to issues such as health care, immigration policies, education, participation in political parties, employment relations, social security, violence against women, trafficking in women, the rights of women in family life (and family law) and the position of rural women. All of this means that the scope of the Convention is very broad and covers virtually every area of human relations.
Within this broad framework, CEDAW has a threefold purpose that finds expression in a threefold obligation of States Parties to the Convention, namely: 1) To implement complete equality in law and in public administration, including enacting a prohibition to discriminate in private relations; 2) To improve the de facto position of women; and 3) To combat the dominant gender stereotypes and gender ideology.
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These obligations and the goals underlying them should not be separated or ranked, but rather must be read as three aspects of one and the same overarching purpose which is the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women.
18 As such, they point at three different strategies that must be used in combination and that are briefly discussed in the following sections.
1.
The non-discrimination principle: a strategy for individual rights
The aim of measures to be adopted under the first CEDAW goal is to ensure that men and women are equal before the law as well as in public and private life. Art. 2 CEDA W obliges the governments of States Parties to the Convention to make sure that the state does not discriminate against women in its laws, policies and practices and that no discrimination is allowed between citizens either. Accordingly, legal impediments excluding women from certain spheres oflife must be abolished and anti-discrimination legislation must be enacted and implemented in an effective way. In practice, this has led to the adoption of legal prohibitions against sex discrimination, with a corresponding Convention not only entails the negative norm to refrain from discrimination against women, but also the positive duty to do everything that is appropriate and necessary to improve the de facto position of women. 22 This goes further than a formal equality standard that merely asserts that men and women are equal and thus should be treated equally. Here, de facto differences are taken into account, meaning that all measures and actions taken to abolish discrimination should result in a higher degree of de facto equality of men and women. In other words, this reflects a material or substantive equality norm.
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In this framework, CEDA W not only provides for individual rights but also for the right for certain excluded, underprivileged or disadvantaged groups of women to gain access to all spheres oflife and to participate therein on their own conditions. 24 The Convention is, therefore, also group-oriented. The strategy to be followed in order to implement this goal can be labelled as a social support strategy. This is a relative obligation, in the sense that each State has to do what is within its reach. For example, Sierra Leone has less potential and resources than EU countries. The idea is that States Parties faithfully work at a gradual implementation of the Convention. In academic writing it is sometimes said that a substantive approach to equality and non-discrimination is more suitable for governments than for the judiciary. A substantive approach entails making decisions about the exact goals that one want to achieve and to the amount of money and other resources that will be made available to implement the policies; see T. Loenen, 'Substantive equality as a right to inclusion: dilemma's and limits in law', 24 (Art. 4 ( 1) CEDAW). Accordingly, women should not be obliged to assimilate to male norms and standards (e.g. with respect to the organization of work and work and family life), but should have real influence on how they participate.
It is important to recognize the differences among women and specify in each measure which groups of women are targeted by a given policy. For support of this interpretation, see General Recommendation No. 25 of the CEDA W Committee.
It should be stressed that such measures should not be the main mechanism to improve women's position but are only a relatively small part of them. Other, structural and non-temporal measures are far more important. To give an example: providing free childcare facilities for all parents is more important than a temporary subsidy scheme that supports working mothers to get some kind of daycare for their children. The term 'affirmative action' is mostly used in the USA whilst 'positive action' is used in the EU/EC context. When reviewing positive action plans, it has to be asked whether the concrete plan at stake is appropriate and necessary to attain the goals set by the Convention, specifically whether it will effectively contribute to accelerating de facto equality between men and women. It is to be expected that the CEDA W Committee, which oversees compliance with the Convention, will consider whether such a plan is embedded in a more general social policy and other strategies aimed at improving the position of women and at tackling the structural causes of discrimination against women. 
3.
Banning gender stereotypes: a strategy for structural change legislation does not allow for any questioning about the ways in which laws, cultures or religious traditions have constructed and maintained the disadvantage of women, or the extent to which institutions are male-defined and based on male conceptions of challenges and harms: 'Systemic discrimination or inequality of conditions, the most damaging form of discrimination, cannot be addressed via the rule-based sameness of treatment approach. Indeed, the use of this model virtually makes systemic disadvantage invisible.' Focusing on systemic or structural discrimination implies a more critical examination of the way in which legal, social, cultural and religious traditions make women subordinate to the male norm. The solution proposed by Cook is an asymmetric and substantive approach to equality under which the test is not whether men and women are treated comparatively equally, but whether a rule or practice is based on powerlessness and exclusion of women and whether such a rule or practice is systematically detrimental to women's needs and interests. This so-called dominance approach was developed by the American feminist legal scholar MacKinnon, according to whom the question in the fight against discrimination should not be whether there is a case of sameness or difference between women and men, but rather what are the power relations between the sexes: 34 'In this approach, an equality question is a question of the distribution of power.
Gender is also a question of power, specifically of male supremacy and female subordination. The question of equality ... is at root a question of hierarchy, whichas power succeeds in constructing social perception and social reality -derivatively becomes a categorical distinction, a difference.'
The conclusion of this analysis of the goals of CEDA W is that whilst the design, adoption and implementation of anti-discrimination legislation (first CEDAW goal) and of measures that are directed at improving the de facto position of women, including positive action plans, (second CEDAW goal) are indispensable for the elimination of gender discrimination, such measures will be ultimately ineffective if the structure and culture of a given society continue to be based on fixed and stereotyped ideas about the different (and inherendy unequal) roles of men and women. Measures at the third level of the Convention's goals (banning gender stereotyping) are therefore also necessary. Because stereotyped views will not change by themselves, it is necessary to develop an active policy in which every legal measure and every public policy is critically examined in order to ensure the elimination of fixed gender stereotypes.
It is against this background that Art. Sa CEDA W provides: 'The State shall take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.' For a long time this provision has been interpreted solely as an obligation to ban gender stereotypes from the mass media and advertising and from school teaching materials. 35 However, Burrows presents a somewhat different view of the provision's meaning, arguing that a correct implementation of the Convention will in itself put an end to the stereotyping of women. This means that Art. Sa CEDA W not only aims at changing deeply rooted social and cultural ideas and patterns of conduct regarding 'appropriate' male and female behaviour, but also aims at changing social structures that are laid down in law and in official practices, that is, 'systemic discrimination' or 'structural discrimination'. 41 States must be aware of the fact that gender stereotypes are not only a matter of ideology but also embedded in the main societal and institutional structures, including law. These structures must change in order to make it possible for both women and men to freely choose in what way they will give content and meaning to their personal identity and life styles. Accordingly, in Art. Sa CEDA W the Convention calls for both a strategy for social and cultural change and a strategy to facilitate diversity. 
SOME BASIC FEATURES OF EC SEX EQUALITY LAW AS COMPARED TO CEDAW
It follows from the foregoing that CEDA W obliges the States Parties to it to follow a multi-layered strategy to combat all forms of discrimination against women. On the basis of the Convention there exists a right not to be discriminated against, which means that individuals have the right to claim equal treatment. With that an individual rights strategy is being followed. By imposing the duty to improve the de facto position of women a social support strategy is being followed. Finally, the third aim of the Convention (abolishing gender stereotypes) entails a strategy for structural social and cultural change and a strategy that facilitates diversity. 42 Again, all three strategies are complementary and should be followed at the same time in any effective equal rights legislative policy. 43 Against this background, the following paragraphs provide a brief and comparative assessment of the basic features of EC law.
A. THE CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION IN EC SEX EQUALITY LAW
It is well known that the starting point in EC non-discrimination law is an interpretation of legal equality as a right to comparatively equal treatment. 44 Indeed, in the most recent generation of EC sex equality legislation, direct sex discrimination is explicitly described as the situation 'where one person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex than The first three generations involve (1) the dismantling offormal legal impediments, (2) the legal prohibition of discrimination by public or private actors and (3) the widening of the scope of unlawful discrimination and the tools to achieve also a positive duty to promote equality; Fredman, 6. According to Shaw, EU legislation and policy in the field of equality already comprise of three main strands that form a 'patchwork of models', namely 'ensuring anti-discrimination in the formal sense, working towards substantive equality and managing diversity'. However, Shaw's analysis shows that the second and third strands are underdeveloped in terms of the legal basis that they rest upon; J. 
2.
Anti-discrimination legislation of the BC
As far as the first strategy of CEDAW (anti-discrimination legislation) is concerned and within the restricted field of application of EC sex equality law, it can be said that the Convention does not offer greater advantages than existing EC law. 59 EC sex equality law prohibits direct and indirect sex discrimination, and (sexual) harassment is a form of discrimination. EC law therefore requires that all laws, regulations and practices in the Member States should be free from sex discrimination. In many Member States this has led to changes in the national law and to a situation where anti-discrimination legislation is operative. 60 However, all of this applies only within the limited field of application of EC law, as mentioned in the previous paragraph. Accordingly, with regard to issues such as political participation, housing, health care and violence against women, there is no obligation to equal treatment and non-discrimination on the basis of EC law. Also, the symmetric and comparative nature of the EC sex discrimination provisions means that these are not in line with the asymmetric, non-comparative and substantive approach of the Convention.
Positive duties to improve the situation of women
According to many, positive duties for EU institutions and for the Member States to work towards the improvement of the position of women are necessary in order to overcome the limited impact of the individual rights approach that is predominant in current EC sex equality law. As Fredman puts it in the context of racial discrimination, 61 it is necessary to 59 60
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'move beyond the fault -based model of existing discrimination law, where legal liability only rests on those individuals who can be shown to have actively discriminated, whether directly or indirectly; and the remedy is to compensate the individual victim. At the root of the positive duty, by contrast, is a recognition that societal discrimination extends well beyond individual acts of racist prejudice. Equality can only be meaningfully advanced if practices and structures are altered proactively by those in a position to bring about real change, regardless of fault or original responsibility. Positive duties are therefore proactive rather than reactive, aiming to introduce equality measures rather than to respond to complaints by individual victims.'
Again, there is one major difference in this respect. EC law outlaws sex discrimination and is equally applicable to men as to women, which means that the norm that there should be no discrimination is in itself 'sex-neutral'. ) the Member States are under no obligation to adopt positive action plans; this is simply a possibility. In certain circumstances this may fall short of the requirements of CEDA W under which there is a positive obligation to improve the situation of women, if necessary by way of positive action or temporary special measures. Another problematic aspect of EC law is that positive action in favour of women is still seen as an exception to sex equality, rather than its other, positive side (which is the conception of CEDAW). See Shaw, in Current Legal Problems 2004, 35-36 . As Shaw points out, the wording of this provision is quite vague, especially when compared to a rejected earlier draft of this Directive, in which it was stated that 'Member States shall introduce such measures as are necessary to enable them actively and visibly to promote the objective of equality between men and women .. .' Shaw links these provisions to the policy of mainstreaming equality in all of the Union's legislation and policies. Compared to the earlier provisions, the wording of Art. 141(4) EC and Art. 2(8) of the Amended Second Equal Treatment Directive ('ensuring full equality in practice between men and women') is more in line with the language of Art. 4(1) CEDAW. For some time, the ECJ's policy in this respect was very restrictive. Only under very strict conditions could positive action measures be lawful under EC-Law. More recently, the Court has emphasised the requirement of proportionality rather than that of strict interpretation; see A. V eldman, 'The lawfulness of women's priority rules in the EC labour market', 5 
4.
Abolishing gender stereotypes
As mentioned above, existing EC sex equality legislation has a strong tendency to assimilate women to the male norms, i.e. norms that are firmly set in the <normal' structures and organizational principles of our societies. In contrast, the substantive, result -oriented equality approach of CEDA W calls for a strategy aimed both at bringing about structural change and at facilitating diversity in order to compensate and correct this effect. However, EC sex equality law, and in particular the Court of Justice's case law, are often criticized for in fact mirroring the precise gender stereotypes which CEDA W seeks to ban. 69 In order to reflect the goals of the Convention, it would be desirable for the law of the EU and of its Member States to explicitly lay down the aims of banning The obligation to ban gender stereotypes is not only a matter of taking legal or policy measures against public advertising, educational materials or cultural or religious institutions that perpetuate the image that women are inferior to men or that women have a 'different' role in life then men. As the in-depth study of Art. Sa CEDA W has revealed, this obligation also concerns the State responsibility to scrutinise its own contribution to the prevalence of such stereotypes in maintaining laws and policies that perpetuate them? 0
The main tool or mechanism that can be used in the context of implementing the third goal of the Convention is that of gender mainstreaming. 71 Since the Amsterdam revision of the EU and EC Treaties, 72 Art. 3(2) EC has been obliging the European
Community to 'aim to eliminate inequalities, and promote equality, between men and women' in all its fields of activity. Art. 1 (1) (a) of the amended Second Equal Treatment Direct makes this somewhat more concrete by providing that 'Member States shall actively take into account the objective of equality between men and women when formulating and implementing laws, regulations, administrative provisions, policies and 'Gender mainstreaming involves not restricting efforts to promote equality to the implementation of specific measures to help women, but mobilising all general policies and measures specifically for the purpose of achieving equality by actively and openly taking into account at the planning stage their possible effects on the respective situation of men and women (gender perspective). This means systematically examining measures and policies and taking into account such possible effects when defining and implementing them.' military service are not comparable for the purposes of calculation of a termination payment in employment. The Court's reasoning implies that, unlike military service, the bringing up of children does not lie in the public interest. According to some commentators, there is now a clear legal framework for gender mainstreaming in the European Union, which will be even stronger if the Constitutional Treaty enters into force. 74 This framework, however, lacks effectiveness not only because the Constitutional Treaty may never become binding but also since it does not describe in any detail what the Union itself or Member States should do in this respect. As Shaw points rightly out, 'a strongly worded obligation on public authorities to engage in the mainstreaming of gender, or equality, with a clear legal basis, is fundamental to the success of mainstreaming endeavours, not least because it overcomes resistance on the part of policy-makers.'
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Apart from implementing a strong and clear mainstreaming policy, more efforts need to be made to introduce instruments to reveal and to change social and cultural structures that are based on gender stereotypes on the practical level. Such efforts include in particular a gender examination or gender assessment of all existing and forthcoming laws and official state programmes and other legislative acts. This process of gender auditing or, as it is often called, Gender Impact Assessment (GIA), would clarify the effects of the laws, policies or regulations on the de facto position of women and determine to what extent they reflect (and re-establish) gender stereotyped views of the respective roles of men and women?
6 It can certainly be argued that Art. 3(2) EC entails the obligation for Member States to engage in a process of gender auditing. 77 On a more general level, it is to be hoped that the planned European Gender Equality lnstitute 78 will be able to play an important role in the context of gender mainstreaming, for example by providing expertise.
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In conclusion of this part on the EC approach to sex equality as compared to CEDA W, the above shows that EC law is not fully in line with the Convention for a variety of reasons. The most important reasons would appear to be the comparatively very limited scope of EC law, this legal order's symmetric approach to sex equality and the lack of sufficient efforts on the practical level towards revealing and changing social and cultural structures that are based on gender stereotypes. A further significant shortcoming is the fact that positive action in EC law is a mere possibility but never a duty. §4. THE INFLUENCE OF CEDA W ON EC SEX EQUALITY LAW Given the differences between the approach of EC law and that of CEDA W, and the fact that the latter is better for women, the conclusion must be that the greater the influence of CEDAW on EC law, the better. What then, is that influence in existing law and policy, and potentially for the future?
A. THE INFLUENCE ON EXISTING LAW AND POLICY
1.
Soft law and policy documents
On the level of soft law, CEDA W appears quite often, though usually only in one particular context, namely that of EU relations with third countries. The European Union's Human Rights Report for the year 2003 80 provides an example. Whilst in the part on Human Rights ofWomen (4.3.11) no reference to the Convention can be found in the section on 'Human Rights within the EU', it immediately appears in the part 'Actions on human rights in international affairs'. The impression thereby created is that explicit reference to CEDA W is necessary when talking about 'the others' but not for the EU itself whose internal law-it seems to be implied-creates no difficulties in this regard. However, whilst it is true that much ofEC sex equality law and soft law reflects CEDAW goals, it has been shown above that an assumption according to which all of !he current EC law is fully in line with the Convention would clearly not be correct.
2.
Secondary legislation
For a few years, the EC has been invoking CEDA W in preambles of certain secondary legislation. This first happened in a field other than sex equality, namely in the Race Directive 81 (recital 3), based on the Commission's proposal for this important piece of Directive. If so, the only remaining reference in the field of sex equality law will be that in another recent Directive mentioned earlier in this paper, namely the Goods and Services Directive (recital 2). It is submitted that the lack of a reference to CEDAW (or to any other international human rights instrument, for that matter) in the Recasting Directive is a very regrettable step backwards. After all, the Court's case law shows that the content of the preamble can influence the interpretation of the provisions of a measure of secondary legislation. 88 It is therefore very much to be hoped that the text of the preamble of the Recasting Directive will be changed accordingly.
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On a more general level, it should be added that thus far the references to CEDA W in EC non-discrimination legislation are no more than mere formal invocations of the human rights background of the relevant measures. There is as of yet no statement of substance, that is, on the question whether the content of the law is in line with the Convention. It is submitted that if the banning of sex discrimination is to be taken seriously in the EU, the institutions would do well to take CEDAW much more seriously when drafting secondary legislation.
3.
Case law -In the Court's case law, CEDAW is hardly ever mentioned. The conclusion of the above is that thus far the influence of CEDA W on EC sex equality law has been very limited. This leads to the question whether and in how far it might be possible to construe a legal argument that the EC is obliged to align its law to that of the Convention, in preventing or resolving conflicts between the two legal orders. Below, three aspects are discussed briefly: first, Art. 307 EC on the relationship between EC law and international Treaties, then the argument of Human Rights and, finally, the question of the accountability ofEU Member States for breaches of international law through EC law.
The formal perspective: Art. 307 BC
When looking for a legal argument that the EC is obliged to align its law to that of CEDAW, the natural starting point is the general rules of EC law concerning the relationship between EC law on the one hand and international law in a broader sense on the other hand. In practice, some cases are easy due to particular circumstances. For example, given that the EC is a signatory party to the WTO agreement, it is clear that the European Community is bound by WTO law. This shows that ultimately the idea behind Art. 307 EC is clearly that of the precedence of EC law over other and conflicting international law. In the framework of the duty to sincere cooperation, enshrined in Art. 10 EC, the principle of precedence applies all the more in the case of so-called new Treaties, that is, where a Member State became a party to CEDA W only after having joined the EC, as is the case with the original six Member States. Overall, the conclusion is that Art. 307 EC does not go very far in obliging the Member States to respect international law that is in conflict with EC law. Finally, it should be noted that, under the Court's case law, the protection of third parties to old Treaties under Art. 307 EC does not mean that the EC itself is bound in its relationship with such parties (Burgoa, 99 para. 8 and 9).
The substantive perspective: Human Rights
Given that the technical, doctrinal approach offers no help in the present context, a more substantive approach should be considered, relying on the special nature of CEDA W as part of the larger body of human rights law. takes account of international instruments relating to the protection of human rights. However, it should be noted that the EC itself is not a party to CEDAW, which, in addition, is not explicitly mentioned in Art. 6 EU. Indeed, when interpreting and applying EC law that binds the Member States, the Court of Justice considers the broader international human rights law merely as a source of inspiration. As the Court said in Grant (para. 45), the fundamental rights under international law 'cannot in themselves have the effect of extending the scope of the Treaty provisions beyond the competences of the Community'. In other words, the Court is willing to take international law into account only within the limits of EC law. Mutatis mutandis, the same will be true for other institutions. This touches upon an issue mentioned earlier in this paper, namely the limits imposed by the distribution of powers between the Member States and the EC.
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In the present writers' view, this is one of the most important issues in EC nondiscrimination law. To take again the example of positive action, under such an approach the Court might argue that the Member States gave away powers to the EC only insofar as positive action is allowed but not in the sense of an obligation, and that therefore there can be no obligation under EC law, whatever the approach of the Convention. Accordingly, the human rights approach does not seem to be very promising when it comes to changing the approach to sex equality under EC law. Nevertheless, it is submitted that within the existing framework it is important to consistently invoke CEDA W before the Court of Justice in the hope that the Court will actively take account of this important instrument of international human rights law and that, in this way, the Convention will have a positive effect on the Court of Justice's case law. 
3.
The pragmatic approach -or turning around the argument Finally, if the approaches mentioned so far are not very promising, perhaps the argument can be turned around: if the EC as such is not bound by CEDA W so as to be obliged to align its law to the Convention, it might be argued that the Member States are obliged to change EC law in the light of the Convention. In theory at least, such a change is easily possible: after all, and as the German Constitutional Court has emphasised in its famous Maastricht judgment, 103 the Member States are the Masters of the Treaty, which means that the reach, shape and content of EC law depends on them and them alone. The Member States might ask why they should work for such a change. In the present writers' view, the answer is simple: under public international law there is the principle that Treaties have to be observed (pacta sunt servanda On the one hand, it has given them the tools to press unwilling governments of Member States to legislate against sex discrimination. This led to considerable improvement in the legal situation of women, in particular on the level of individual rights. On the other hand, EC sex equality law continues largely to be based on a concept of discrimination that has considerable negative effects, including in particular the need to have to justify positive action because it is seen as a derogation from the equality principle. Against this background, this present contribution presented CEDA W as a possible avenue towards a more human rights-oriented approach to gender equality in the European Union. The argument was that, even though there is no formal legal obligation of the EU institutions to comply with the Convention, this Convention can offer a refreshing and new perspective, as is evident in particular from the fact that it defines discrimination against women in a far more substantive way than current EC legislation, and, further, from the Convention's clear human rights perspective. Although CEDAW does not have the same immediately binding force as EC law, it does offer considerable advantages for European women and feminist lawyers to work with this important piece of international human rights law with its multi-layered strategy towards the elimination of discrimination against women and its substantive approach to equality. In particular, the Convention does not stick to a reactive and prohibiting (or negative) approach to equality issues, but is truly proactive and imposes positive obligations on governments to put an end to discrimination. It is to be hoped that in the future, more intense use is made of CEDA W by women activists, policy makers, lawyers and the judiciary in the European Union.
